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Why Are So Few Females Promoted into CEO and  
Vice-President Positions? Danish Empirical Evidence 1997-2007
* 
 
In most OECD countries, only very few women succeed in reaching top executive positions.  
In this paper, the probability of promotion into VP and CEO positions is estimated based on 
employer-employee data on all Danish companies observed during the period 1997-2007. 
After controlling for a large number of family-related variables, including take-up history of 
maternity and paternity leave and proxies for ‘female-friendly’ companies, there is still a 
considerable gap in the promotion probabilities for CEO positions, but not for VP positions. 
Thus, the results cannot confirm recent theories on ‘belief flipping’ or disappearance of 
statistical discrimination against women who succeed getting into career track positions. The 
results reflect that the hiring decision and the decision to enter a top position as ‘number 
one’, i.e. CEO, in the organization is very different from the decision to hire or become VP, 
i.e. ‘number two’ or lower. 
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as research assistants on the project. 1 Introduction
The main motivation for this study on promotion into top executive positions is the fact that women
constitute a very small proportion of CEOs in most OECD countries, despite the fact that women in
many countries are as educated as their male peers and also have been active labour market participants
during the latest decades. In Denmark, only 7 % of the CEOs in companies with more than 50 employees
are women, and for the other Scandinavian countries the picture is about the same. Restricting to larger
companies, the proportion of women among CEOs is even smaller. Since Danish women were ￿jointly
with other Nordic women - among the ￿rst in the Western world to enter the labour market during the
1960s and 1970s, these ￿gures may at ￿rst glance be surprisingly low. Furthermore, the fact that women
are increasingly improving on e.g. educational attainment and males are increasingly taking part in care
for children and household work in general would suggest that the promotion chances of women relative
to men should have increased considerably over time. Also, there has been an increasing focus in the
management literature on the advantages of diversity management, which might have induced ￿rms to
increase the share of women in the executive teams and on the boards in general.
A few years ago, Denmark and other Scandinavian countries were nominated as forerunners with
respect to equal opportunities and family-friendly policies in a number of OECD country studies published
under the title ￿ Babies and Bosses, Reconciling work and family life￿ , see OECD (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005).
The Scandinavian countries were praised by OECD for having been able to maintain a fairly stable fertility
rate during the latest decades when Scandinavian women entered the labour market and became full time
workers. Denmark is ranked as number 7 (of 134 countries) on the overall ￿Gender Gap Index￿ , see World
2Economic Forum (2010). However, when it comes to the representation of women in top positions in the
labour market, the Scandinavian countries are not forerunners. Denmark is ranked as low as no. 68 with
respect to the gender gap for representation among ￿legislators, senior o¢ cials and managers￿ .
This paper analyzes the question why so few women succeed in becoming promoted into top executive
positions as CEOs or Vice-Presidents in a Nordic country, Denmark? Are there still discriminatory
forces working against women, either through classical discriminatory mechanisms or via more subtle
mechanisms like imperfect information and statistical discrimination, giving rise to the same outcomes
as classical discrimination, but working via di⁄erent channels and for di⁄erent reasons? Alternatively,
another hypothesis is that the observed and apparent ￿glass-ceiling￿may partly be explained by observed
and unobserved di⁄erences with respect to career decisions, preferences, characteristics and risk behavior
of male and female managers. In particular, we investigate whether observed behavior with respect to
timing of childbirths, periods out of the labour market, and choice of partner and spouse can explain the
gender gap and whether these potential e⁄ects vary across the career ladder and are strongest at the top?
This study tests two recent dynamic models of statistical discrimination in promotion, originally
proposed by Fryer (2007) and Bjerk (2008). The model by Fryer predicts that women may face statistical
discrimination and higher hiring standards at a lower level on the career ladder, but if they succeed in
becoming promoted into high-level executive positions, ￿ belief ￿ ipping￿may happen, i.e. women may face
￿ inverse discrimination￿because employers know they were selected from the top of the ability distribution.
Contrary to Fryer, Bjerk￿ s model predicts that there is no gender gap in promotions at the highest
levels in the organization. In this paper, we focus explicitly on the upper levels: The promotion from
a (high) executive position into a Vice-President position (VP) and the promotion from VP to Chief
Executive O¢ cer (CEO). The model is estimated on a Danish employer-employees sample of top executives
and potential top executives observed during the period 1996-2007 covering all Danish private or listed
companies with more than 50 employees. The probability models are estimated by panel logit models.
The novelty of this paper is that we apply a model of statistical discrimination on the narrow top
3positions as VP and CEO and estimate the model on a large panel sample which covers all Danish
companies with more than 50 employees in the private sector. The large sample allows us to dig more
deeply into the relation between the promotion of female top executives and childbirths, maternal leave
periods out of the labor market, the careers of spouses, and the gender composition of the management
board and board of directors. We present new empirical evidence on the paradox that there still exists a
considerable gender gap or glass ceiling at the top of the Danish labor market despite the fact that it is
now more than a half century since Danish women entered the labor market, despite of more decades with
family-friendly policies, and despite the fact that women are now more educated than men and constitute
a majority at universities.
Our results indicate that when controlling for a large number of observed and unobserved time-
invariant ￿rm and individual characteristics, there is still a signi￿cant gender gap in promotion rates
into VP and CEO positions. Child-related variables as number of children and take-up of maternity
leave in the past and variables re￿ ecting whether the ￿rms are expected to have a ￿ female friendly￿
recruitment policy have signi￿cantly di⁄erent coe¢ cients for male and female executives in the estimated
promotion functions, but even allowing for gender-speci￿c coe¢ cients for these variables, we are not able
to reduce the ￿ unexplained gap￿ , i.e. the coe¢ cient of the gender indicator to insigni￿cance. We ￿nd
empirical evidence that the promotion processes into VP positions are di⁄erent from promotion into CEO
positions, conditional of having reached a VP position. But we cannot con￿rm an a priori hypothesis
that statistical discrimination e⁄ects are more pronounced for promotions into VP positions than for
promotion into CEO positions. We tend to ￿nd the opposite. Thus, we cannot con￿rm recent theories on
the existence of ￿ belief ￿ ipping￿or disappearance of statistical discrimination against women who succeed
in getting into career track positions. The results re￿ ect that the hiring decision and the decision to enter
a top position as ￿ number one￿ , i.e. CEO, in the organization is very di⁄erent from the decision to hire or
become VP, i.e. ￿ number two￿or lower. Our results indicate that gender di⁄erences in preferences with
respect to top positions may interact with statistical discrimination mechanisms in a complex way.
42 Earlier Studies and Empirical Evidence
One of the ￿rst economic models on the gender gap in promotion is presented in Lazear and Rosen (1990).
Their model predicts a glass ceiling in promotion rates for women without assuming any taste-based
discrimination among employers and assuming similar job ability distributions for men and women. The
driving assumption is that women are superior to men in the ability of non-market work, e.g. housework
and care for children, and therefore have a higher probability of leaving the job as the non-market
alternative is more likely to exceed the wage o⁄er. The model predicts that women must have higher
abilities than men to become promoted and therefore, on average, are less likely to be promoted. Booth et
al. (2003) use the concept ￿ sticky ￿ oors￿as an alternative explanation of the few women observed at the
top of the hierarchy. ￿ Sticky ￿ oors￿refers to a process where women are promoted to the same extent as
their male colleagues but experience a slower subsequent compensation growth upon promotion. If female
executives are less ￿ exible compared to men (because of obligations at home, they may not be able to
commute long distances, the family may be less willing to move because of new job opportunities of the
mother etc.), they may have less favorable outside opportunities, i.e. they are not able to be promoted
by getting a better job in another company to the same extent as their male colleagues. Their current
employer may be aware of this fact and may exploit it by o⁄ering lower wages to female executives.
A few recent papers aim at explaining the existence of a glass ceiling as an equilibrium outcome in a
dynamic model, see Fryer (2007) and Bjerk (2008). These models build on the assumption that women
either have a higher turnover rate (due to childbirth-related career interruptions) or they are less able
to signal their skills for di⁄erent reasons compared to their male peers, i.e. the models are basically
variants of the statistical discrimination theory, originally proposed by Phelps (1972). Bjerk￿ s model may
be considered a synthesis of glass ceiling and sticky ￿ oor models in the sense that both e⁄ects can coexist.
Statistical discrimination against women is explained by the fact that the majority of those making
promotion decisions are men and this fact ￿ explains￿why women have more di¢ culties in signalling their
productivity as e⁄ectively or/and as frequently as their male counterparts. According to the model in
5Bjerk (2008), female executives face statistical discrimination at lower levels, but for those women who
succeed in getting into a career track there is no statistical discrimination. In the model by Fryer (2007),
female executives even face ￿ belief ￿ ipping￿implying that they have higher promotion rates to higher level
positions than their male peers.
In the sociological and management literature, a parallel theory to the economic statistical discrimina-
tion models and ￿ belief theories￿has been the ￿ gender stereotyping models￿ . One hypothesis is the ￿ Think
Manager-Think Male￿hypothesis which says that there is a tight relation between sex role stereotypes
and the characteristics which are necessary in order to become a successful manager, see Schein (1973).
I.e. employers, colleagues and even the potential top executives themselves, whether males or females,
tend to have gender stereotype views on what it takes to hold a position as a CEO. This may give rise
to the (statistical) discrimination e⁄ects described above, or it may keep women away from applying for
top executive positions because they ￿nd them more unattractive and more di¢ cult to combine with a
good life than comparable men do. Women may feel they have to give up a ￿ normal life￿if they shall ￿ll
the role as a CEO.
Another explanation of the low proportion of female top executives is that women do not want to
take the risk and responsibilities related to top executive jobs, see e.g. Booth and Nolen (2009) and
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). Niederle and Vesterlund show that women are more reluctant to engage
in a competitive tournament incentive scheme than their male counterparts, even though female ability
and performance equalize male ability and performance. Women may dislike competition more than
men or they may be less self-con￿dent than men with respect to their own abilities. According to the
experiments in Niederle and Vesterlund, it is mainly the latter e⁄ect which explains why women ￿ shy
away￿from competition. If men and women possess di⁄erent behavior with respect to applying for top
executive positions, these di⁄erences may enhance the observed gender gap in promotion probabilities at
lower levels in the hierarchy as predicted in the models by Fryer and Bjerk. But they may reverse the
predictions concerning the gender gap at top level promotions if women are more reluctant to apply for
6positions at the highest level, i.e. CEO positions, because of di⁄erent preferences or less con￿dence on
own abilities.
The empirical results concerning gender di⁄erences in promotion rates (de￿ned more broadly, i.e. not
restricted to CEO positions) are mixed, see for instance Blau and DeVaro (2006). When controlling for
other observed factors, some studies ￿nd that women are less likely to get promoted in private ￿rms,
see for instance McCue (1996), Cobb-Clark (2001), Blau and DeVaro (2006), and Frederiksen and Kato
(2011). However, other studies do not con￿rm this pattern. Booth et al. (2003) ￿nd that women are
promoted to about the same extent as men, but they do not get as high wage growth after promotion
as men (the ￿ sticky ￿ oor￿result). The in￿ uence of personal traits is investigated empirically by Fietze
et al.(2009) who ￿nd that German men seem to be more willing to take risks compared to women, but
according to this study these personal traits cannot explain much of the gender gap with respect to
occupational positions in Germany. Bell (2005) ￿nds that promotion chances of female executives are
signi￿cantly higher in women-led ￿rms in the US. I.e. there is a positive e⁄ect of female CEOs or female
board chairmen on the salaries and promotion rates of female managers at lower levels in the ￿rm.
Blau and DeVaro (2006) include the gender of the supervisor when explaining promotion into higher
ranking positions and do not ￿nd any e⁄ect of the gender of the supervisor. As they note, this does not
rule out the possibility of gender discrimination against females in executive positions if female supervisors
also have prejudices against women subordinates ￿sometimes denoted the ￿ Queen Bee Syndrome￿ . This
hypothesis is actually con￿rmed by Neergaard et al. (2008) who ￿nd that Danish managers have a fairly
stereotype perception of what it takes to become a successful manager. The most surprising ￿nding in
their study is that it is mainly female managers who have very gender stereotype views on what it takes
to become a successful manager, while male managers are much more gender neutral in Denmark!
There are very few empirical studies on the gender gap in promotion rates at the highest level, i.e.
CEO level, in the company, but a few empirical studies have analyzed the compensation gap among CEOs.
In the seminal study by Bertrand and Hallock (2001) on the earnings of US CEOs, the ￿ raw￿compensation
7gap between male and female top executives was estimated to be 44 %, but when controlling for di⁄erences
in observed characteristics, most of the gender compensation gap disappeared, i.e. it was ￿ explained￿by
observed factors. For Denmark, a recent study by Smith et al. (2011) also documents that occupational
position is a very important determinant of gender compensation di⁄erentials among top executives. To
our knowledge, the only other paper analyzing the gender gap in promotion of CEOs is the paper by
Matsa and Miller (2011). They ￿nd that the female share of board of directors has a signi￿cantly positive
e⁄ect on the female share of top management (top 5 positions) in US S&P companies during the period
1997-2009.
3 Theoretical Framework
The model applied in this study builds on the model in Bjerk (2008). We assume that in a career track
for top executives there are two steps to the top: A potential top executive may be promoted from the
Pool of Potentials (POP) into the position as a Vice-President (VP). There may be more than one VP
in a given company. CEOs are selected among the VPs in the ￿rm concerned or recruited among VPs
outside the ￿rm.1 There are two types of workers in the POP group: h-workers who are high-skilled and
l-workers who are low-skilled. By ￿ skill￿we understand unobservable personal traits as ambitions, e⁄ort
and in general productivity. Those who are high-skilled never fail in the tasks which they perform during
their career, while type-l workers sometimes fail when they are recruited into positions as VPs or CEOs.
Employers believe - and we assume they are right in their belief - that the proportion of men who are
of the h-type is larger than the proportion of females, ￿f < ￿m, where ￿j is the proportion of type h in
group j, j=m, f. Within the two skill groups, h- and l-workers, there are no gender di⁄erences in skills
and productivity, and employers are not assumed to have discriminating preferences.
In order to become promoted up and out of the POP group, workers have to send a number of
1In the empirical model we also allow POPs to jump directly into a CEO position because this behavior is actually
observed in our data.
8positive signals to their leaders or supervisors who are responsible for their promotion. The signals help
the supervisors to reveal whether potential top executives who have not yet been in a position where
they undertake top management decisions and tasks are h-workers or l-workers. I.e. the signals help the
supervisors to promote the most productive members in the POP group. The signals may appear when
POPs socialize and communicate with their leaders, either at work or in social activities related to the job.
Bjerk (2008) assumes that these signals, positive or negative, are more easily understood by supervisors
who come from the same group, i.e. men are better in understanding and decoding the signals from
men, and women better understand signals from other women. The reason may be gender di⁄erences in
communication styles and topics or psychological mechanisms. The probability that an l-worker via the
signals reveals himself as an l-worker is denoted ￿j, i.e. ￿j is the probability of sending a negative signal
j, j=m, f for individuals who are l-workers. h-workers always send positive signals. If we assume that
leaders who make promotion decisions are men and that men are better in decoding signals from male
POPs compared to female POPs, we have that ￿m > ￿f.2
Men and women are assumed to di⁄er with respect to their ability to send signals, for instance
because women in the POP group experience more career interruptions than their male peers during
the childbearing and child-rearing period. Another reason may be that female potential top executives
socialize less with (male) superiors because they are not members of the same networks, or they are not
invited or do not accept invitations to the same extent as their male peers to for instance sport events.
If women have less experience and tenure due to family responsibilities or social networks and activities
etc., they are assumed to send signals with a lower intensity, ￿, i.e. ￿f < ￿m:The lower female signalling
frequency may of course also re￿ ect that women have less preferences for top positions compared to their
male peers, either because of taste di⁄erences, less self-con￿dence on own abilities etc., as indicated by
recent experimental studies as for instance Niederle and Vesterlund (2007).
Based on these three main assumptions, we apply the results in Bjerk (2008) which show that there
2An alternative interpretation of ￿ might be that formal or informal mentoring processes within the ￿rm are mainly taking
place within same-sex relations, see Athey et al. (2000).
9may exist a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium where the hiring standards (measured by the expected
number of signals that a member of the POP group shall send until promotion into a VP position)
are higher for women than for men. More speci￿cally, the probability that the employer considers an
individual as being a type h-worker conditional that the individual has sent n positive signals is shown
to be




(1￿￿j)n, where j=m, f
If ￿f < ￿m or ￿m > ￿f, it is easily seen that for a given number of signals, n:
(2) pm(n) > pf(n)
Thus, for a given number of signals, employers will believe that male members of the POP group have
a higher probability of being a type h-worker compared to female members, cet. par., either because there
are relatively more h-workers among male POPs or because the employers more easily decode the signals
from male POPs than from female POPs.
In order to become promoted into a VP position, an individual from the POP group has to send a
su¢ cient number of positive signals (n￿
j) to convince the employer that he/she is a h-worker. If the risk-
neutral employer maximizes expected pro￿t from promoting a POP individual into a VP position, and
given supplementary assumptions concerning the expected loss and gains from recruiting from h-workers
and l-workers into VP positions, see Bjerk (2008), the employer calculates a hiring standard p￿
V P which is
the minimum value of the probability given by (1) of being a type h-worker in order to become promoted
into a VP position. p￿
V P is denoted the "hiring standard" for promotion into VP positions and it is not
assumed to di⁄er between men and women since there is no discriminatory preferences among employers.
The number of signals (n) which an individual from the POP group has to send before becoming promoted
is given by the minimum solution to
(3) pj(n) ￿ p￿
V P, where j=m, f.
10Due to the assumptions concerning employers￿beliefs or their ability to decode signals (￿f < ￿m or
￿m > ￿f ), the number of signals that female POPs will have to send before they are promoted into a
VP position will be larger, n￿
f > n￿
m. Further, if women tend to have a lower signalling intensity, i.e.
￿f < ￿m, and since hiring standards are the same for male and female applicants, the model implies that
female members of the POP group will on average be older when they are promoted into a VP position.
The fewer women employers believe are h-workers, the more di¢ cult female signals are decoded, and the
more children and long leave periods out of the labor market that female executives have had, the lower
is the probability that they are promoted to a VP position, cet. par.
When being employed in a VP position, the individual is assumed to take important management
decisions and the employer (now the owner of the company or the board of directors) no longer has to rely
on signals. Instead they observe the number of successful tasks undertaken by the VP, sj; j = f;m. The
probability that an l-worker employed as a VP fails in doing a task is ￿ (h-workers never fail). In the model
by Fryer (2007), the employer uses the information that individuals from the minority group (women)
are a more positively selected group than male VPs. Thus, the Fryer model predicts that in the next
promotion step women will bene￿t from this knowledge and will face "belief ￿ ipping", i.e. face "inverse
statistical discrimination" and have higher promotion probabilities than their male peers. Contrary to
Fryer, Bjerk (2008) assumes that employers apply gender-neutral information on actual performance in
the job as a VP. Since the employers know that individuals in VP positions have ful￿lled the condition
for becoming a VP, i.e. pj(n) > p￿
V P, this information is used when the employer, the board of directors,
or the owners of the company consider the promotion into a CEO position instead of the less informative
information given by ￿j: Information on sj and p￿
V P is used to calculate whether a VP who applies for a
CEO position ful￿lls the hiring standard for a CEO position, p￿
CEO.3 The employer will believe that an
individual in a VP position who has completed sj; j = f;m successful tasks in the VP job is a h-worker
3It can be shown that if the expected cost of employing an l-worker who fails is larger for a CEO position than for a VP





CEO; see Bjerk (2008).
11with a probability








Promotion into a CEO position requires that this probability exceeds the hiring standard p￿
CEO, i.e.
(5) p(sj) ￿ p￿
CEO:
Since the hiring standards and the probability of being successful in doing the tasks in VP positions
(1 ￿ ￿) are the same for men and women, and since the performance of the individual worker, i.e. the
number of successful tasks, sj, is the only parameter which matters, not the group mean, ￿j, this means
that there is no statistical discrimination taking place when promoting into CEO positions. There may
still be lower observed promotion rates for women from VP to CEO if female VPs do not complete as
many successful tasks as their male peers, i.e. have smaller values of sj at a given age or for given observed
human capital variables for the same reasons as their lower signalling intensity in the ￿rst step from POP
to VP. But controlling for sj by for instance controlling for number of years of experience or number
of years spent in VP positions, one should expect no gender di⁄erence in promotion rates in the Bjerk
model, contrary to the Fryer model which predicts a higher female promotion rate.
When focusing on promotion into the top level position as a CEO, the results in the Fryer and
Bjerk models may not be fully applicable because the decision on whom to hire for the CEO position
in the company may be di⁄erent from other top executive positions at lower levels in the company.4
Often the "decision-making agent" is di⁄erent for the CEO position where it is the board of directors
or the chairman of the board of directors who are responsible and may often take decisions assisted by
professional headhunters or consultants (for large ￿rm this may of course also happen for VP positions).
The decision process in a given company may function more like a tournament with m contestants where
4We may consider the probability in (5) as describing the probability of "promotion into a CEO position" in a very broad
way, not restricted to internal recruitment within a given company, if the information on having performed succesful tasks is
common knowledge among all ￿rms or headhunters who assist in the CEO hiring proces. In this case (5) may still hold. In
this study we do not distinguish between internal and external promotions, and do not test whether the gender gap di⁄ers
depending on external or internal promotion.
12only the ￿ winner￿gets the CEO position, i.e. there is no implicit hiring standard as indicated by (5).
Instead, the board chooses among the best contestants who have performed best and supplied the highest
level of e⁄ort (now re￿ ected in si). Thus, the probability of becoming promoted for individual i may be
formulated as5
(6) Pi = P[p(si) = max
j2m
fp(sj)g]
This may change the implication of the model with respect to a potential gender gap in promotion
chances into CEO positions:
(a) The cost for the company if an l-type individual is promoted into the CEO position and fails is
typically much larger than for lower positions. If the board of directors are (more) risk-averse when it
comes to the CEO decision, they may be more reluctant to employ individuals from the minority group.
Another mechanism may be that the board of directors or the chairman of the board may be more external
to the company and to a smaller extent rely on actual information on successful tasks (sj) and to a larger
extent rely on gender stereotype attitudes and biased evaluations compared to the promotion process at
lower levels where the hiring agent is internal in the company and more directly observes performance.
(b) The concept ￿ successful task￿may not be an objective concept. If male supervisors or headhunters
(unconsciously) su⁄er from old-fashioned beliefs on female productivity, e⁄ort, and behavior, there may
be statistical discrimination forces taking place at this step in the evaluation of what is a successful task,
i.e. ￿ in (4) may di⁄er between male and female VPs even when they have the same productivity and
skills.
(c) For a given sj, female VPs may ￿nd it less attractive to apply for CEO positions and be in the
contestant pool if they have less preferences for the responsibilities associated with the job as a CEO and
are less self-con￿dent with respect to own abilities (underestimate sj and send signals which underreport
5This way of reformulating the model is a very simple way of introducing the tournament concept. Alternatively, the
statistical discrimination model may be combined with a more formal tournament approach in line with Lazear and Rosen
(1981) where gender di⁄erences in e⁄ort of the agents may give rise to gender di⁄erences in promotion rates. Fryer and Bjerk
do not explicitly model the promotion process between the two highest levels in the company as we do in this paper. Thus
(6) should be considered a potential ￿ supplement￿to the more general promotion models in Fryer and Bjerk.
13sj ). This may induce a gender gap with respect to who applies for CEO positions which does not exist
(to the same extent) for lower positions.
Thus, we expect that there may also exist a negative gender gap in promotion probabilities into CEO
positions, contrary to the Bjerk model which predicts no gap and the Fryer model which predicts a positive
gap, i.e. that females have higher promotion probabilities, cet. par.
3.1 Empirical Model
The empirical model is a reduced form model where we estimate the gender gap in the probabilities of
promotion from POP to VP and from VP to CEO, i.e. the probability of becoming a CEO conditional of
being in a VP position. Thus we estimate the probability that the expressions given by (3) and (5) are
ful￿lled for executive i:
(7) Promotion I (to a V P position): Pi(pj(n) > p￿
V P)
(8) Promotion II (to a CEO position): Pi(p(sj) > p￿
CEO) or P[p(si) = max
j2m
fp(sj)g]
(7) and (8) are estimated on the employer-employee data set described in Section 5 which allows us
to control for both observed ￿rm-speci￿c factors (xjt) in the recruiting ￿rms, individual-speci￿c factors
(xit), and unobserved heterogeneity captured by the time-invariant ￿rm-speci￿c and individual-speci￿c
terms, ￿j and ￿i. The key variable F is an indicator variable assuming the value of 1 for women, and 0
else. If the latent variable for Promotion k = V P;CEO of individual i in ￿rm j at time t is denoted yk
ijt;
the model is given by
(9) yk






where i = 1;:::;M; j = 1;::::;N; t = 1;:::;T, k = V P;CEO, and ￿k
ijt is a random error term.
The empirical hypotheses to be tested are:
(i) ￿V P <0, re￿ ecting ￿f < ￿m and/or ￿m > ￿f, and/or ￿f < ￿m:
14(ii) ￿CEO >0 if belief ￿ ipping (Fryer),
￿CEO =0 if gender-neutral promotion within the career track (Bjerk) or
￿CEO <0 if CEO promotions are described by tournament processes given by (6).
Further, we test how the estimates of ￿V P and ￿CEO are a⁄ected by including additional explanatory
variables to the model in (9) which are supposed to proxy the gender-speci￿c parameters determining the
probabilities in (3), (5) and (6):
(iii.a) The signalling intensity, ￿j and the number of successful tasks completed in VP positions (sj)
are expected to di⁄er between male and female executives. We test whether ￿V P and ￿CEO become
insigni￿cant when controlling for (gender speci￿c) e⁄ects of tenure and children, age at ￿rst childbirth,
time spent on parental leave, and the career of the spouse. We expect that the number of children and
the time spent in maternity leave have a negative e⁄ect on promotion chances of female executives. We
also expect that age at ￿rst childbirth has a positive e⁄ect on the career for women (but not necessarily
for men) because having completed an education and having established a career before childbirth may
improve the chances that women are able to come back on the career track after childbirth. We also
expect that being married to a spouse who is a CEO has a negative e⁄ect on the promotion chances on
women where the occupation of the spouse is taken as a proxy for division of work within the household.
(iii.b) Firm-speci￿c factors may proxy the parameters, ￿j and ￿j: We test whether ￿V P and ￿CEO
become insigni￿cant when controlling for (gender-speci￿c) e⁄ects of a ￿ female-led￿recruiting company (i.e.
led by a female CEO or chairman of the board of directors), the (male) CEO having at least one adult
daughter aged 25 years or more which may have changed his belief about female e⁄ort and ambitions, see
for instance Doepke and Tertilt (2009).
The model is estimated by a panel logit estimator. We apply a random e⁄ects (RE) speci￿cation where
we treat either ￿k
i or ￿k
j as random e⁄ects capturing time-invariant heterogeneity among individuals or
￿rms.6 It is not possible to model both types of heterogeneity simultaneously. The RE logit model requires
6The models are estimated by the STATA procedure "xtprobit" which is a conditional MLE procedure using quadrature
optimizing (Gauss-Hermite with 12 evaluation points). Since the key variable F is time-invariant, FE estimations which
15that ￿k
i and ￿k
j are independent of the included explanatory variables and are normally distributed, see
for instance Wooldridge (2002). If ￿k
i is correlated with F, for instance if women in general are more
risk-averse than men or have less preferences for power and leadership, this may bias the estimate of ￿V P
and ￿CEO downwards (more negative estimate). The assumptions behind the RE model are evaluated
in alternative ways. First, a pooled logit estimation is applied. Secondly, RE models which include the
time-invariant unobservables terms ￿k
i and ￿k
j , respectively, are estimated. The empirical strategy is to
add a large number of control variables from the extremely rich data set available which includes historical
information on spouses, childbirths, leave periods etc. and in this way be able to control for most of the
relevant heterogeneity for the promotion process.
However, it is obvious that one has to be careful in the interpretation of the parameter estimates
which cannot be considered causal e⁄ects since more of the variables may be endogenous to the promotion
probabilities. For instance, if a potential executive does not succeed in becoming promoted, he or she
may choose to have more children cet. par., and the timing decisions with respect to having children may
be endogenous to career aspirations, see for instance Miller (2010). Also unobserved variables may a⁄ect
both the promotion probabilities and some of the right-hand side variables, for instance preferences for
career or family values. Part of the endogeneity problems due to unobservables may be captured by the
panel estimator (￿i e⁄ects) if the unobserved variables are time-invariant. But some of the important
unobservables, like career aspirations, may change over the life cycle, see a discussion of the ￿ ￿xed-e⁄ects-
critique￿in Lundberg (2005).
In order to test and control for endogeneity of the key variable F, ￿rm-speci￿c mean values of F (
_
F)
are added to the model in (9) in the RE (￿rm-speci￿c) estimation. The same procedure is applied for
other individual-speci￿c family-related variables. There it is not possible to use the individual-speci￿c
controls for individual-speci￿c time-invariant unobservables are not feasible. Further, the FE estimator in non-linear probit
models is not as attractive as in linear models, see Wooldridge (2002). Therefore, we select the RE approach. In alternative
estimations not shown here, we have also experimented with FE probit models which control for ￿rm-speci￿c time-invariant
unobservables. The results concerning the coe¢ cient ￿ from these alternative estimations do not deviate from the results
shown below.
16RE estimations since F (and other individual-speci￿c family variables) are time-invariant for individuals,
but not ￿rms).We test whether the coe¢ cient of
_
F is signi￿cant, see Wooldridge (2002, p. 488). The test
values are signi￿cant in all speci￿cations.
4 Data
The data set is a merged employer-employee panel sample of all Danish companies observed during the
period 1996-2007. The companies are privately owned or listed ￿rms. Information from administrative
registers is supplemented with information from a private Danish data account register, Experian. We
restrict the sample to executives who are either in a CEO or VP position, and executives who are at a
hierarchical level just below CEOs and VPs, denoted the pool of potentials, POPs.7 The de￿nition of a
CEO and a VP is restricted to individuals who are top executives in medium-sized or larger companies
with at least 50 employees. Since there are many small ￿rms in Denmark, and since a relatively large
proportion of women start their careers in smaller companies, we also consider a jump from a CEO or
VP position in a small company with less than 50 employees into a position as VP or CEO in a medium
or large company as a promotion. This means that the top executive in a company with less than 50
employees is included in the POP group. Given our de￿nition, there is only one CEO in a ￿rm, while there
may be one or more often a number of VPs. In total, there are 3,053 companies and 57,632 executives in
2007, see Table 1.
(Table 1 about here)
Figure 1 shows the female proportion in the three executive categories for the sample period, 1996-
2007. According to Figure 1, times are changing in the sense that more women have entered top executive
7The exact de￿nition using the Statistics Denmark￿ s ￿ DISCO-codes￿is: CEO=Executive director (RAS-DISCO code 121,
1210). VP=Vice-President (DISCO 122, 123, 1221-1239). Pool of potentials=Potential executives (CEO or VP). (First
digit of DISCO code is 1 but not included in the groups of top or vice directors). The registration of the DISCO codes in
the administrative registers has been improved during the observation period. In order to remove outliers or errors in the
DISCO codes, we restrict the CEO group to individuals who are observed with an annual earnings in top 10 of the ￿rm. The
VP-group is restricted to individuals who are observed among the top 25.
17positions during the period 1996-2007. In 1996, 4 % of the CEOs were women. Ten years later, this ￿gure
had almost doubled to 7.5 %! Also at the lower levels, the female proportion increased.
(Figure 1 about here)
According to Table 1, in 2007, 1890 individuals were promoted into VP positions and 480 were
promoted into a CEO position. Figure 2 shows the gender-speci￿c promotion rates 1997-2007.8
(Figure 2 about here)
There is a clear cyclical pattern in the promotion rates with more promotions taking place before the
cyclical downturn in 2001. In general, all promotion rates in all years are higher for male executives than
for female executives. Contrary to the predictions from the Bjerk and Fryer models, the gender gap in
the ￿ raw￿promotion rates is lower for promotions from POP to VP (about 1 %) compared to promotions
from VP to CEO positions (about 1.7%).
The included explanatory variables in the estimations represent individual- (xit) as well as ￿rm-speci￿c
(xjt) characteristics:
xit: Age, age squared, employment experience, experience squared, tenure, and educational level. Em-
ployment experience (and tenure) is measured as the accumulated number of years spent in employment
(in the company). Periods in part-time employment is counted as half of full-time employment. We are
not able to measure over time work or individuals holding more than one job since the employment vari-
ables are based on pension payments to a compulsory pension scheme (ATP). In some of the estimations
we add information on tenure in di⁄erent positions, i.e. number of years spent as POP or VP in order to
get proxies for the number of signals or successful tasks which the executive has been able to undertake.
Education level is measured by a number of indicators for educational level allowing for non-linear e⁄ects
8In the Appendix, Table A1 shows the number of observations who are ￿ at risk￿of becoming promoted, the absolute
number of promoted executives, and the promotion rates by gender during the sample period1997-2007. The occupational
information (DISCO codes) is based on annual information where we observe the occupational position ultimo November.
This means that we are not able to observe more promotions during the year, for instance a promotion ￿rst into a VP position
and then shortly after further into a CEO position. Depending on when it happens during the year this may be registered
as a jump from a position as ￿ POP￿directly into the CEO category. These observations are excluded.
18of education. Excluded category is no education beyond compulsory school. Child variables are indicators
for number of children (1, 2, and 3+). Excluded category is ￿ no children￿ . In some of the estimations we
also include information on the spouse or cohabitant of the executive. These variables are an indicator for
being married or cohabiting with a spouse who is a CEO and an indicator for being married or cohabiting
with a spouse who is not a CEO. Excluded category is ￿ single￿ .
In order to test whether the timing of childbirth matters for the career as is found in many other
studies, we include in some of the estimations the variable age at ￿rst childbirth (age when becoming a
parent for the ￿rst time), the number of years since last birth of child. (i.e. age of youngest child), and
alternative measures on time spent out of the labor market in a parental leave scheme. From the social
registers we have information on the number of days spent each year on maternity, paternity and parental
leave for all individuals, including information on the spouses that the individuals were living together
with at the time of childbirth in the past. Based on this information, we calculate the accumulated
number of days spent in child-related leave schemes during the career, and the same for the spouse, (if
the individual was not single after childbirth). These variables re￿ ect time spent out of the labor market
but may also proxy division of household responsibilities.
xjt: Firm size is measured by the number of employees (represented by 4 categories to allow for non-
linearities: CEO or VP in a company with less than 50 employees, 50-100 employees, 100-500 employees,
and more than 500 employees). We include information on ￿rm size both for recruiting ￿rm and origin
￿rm. For all other ￿rm variables, the information concerns recruiting ￿rm: An indicator for being listed
on stock exchange, ￿rm pro￿ts ROE (Return On Equities), industry indicators (Energy, Building and
construction, Hotel and restaurants, Transportations and telecommunications, and Finance), and female
proportion of employees. In some of the estimations we include variables re￿ ecting whether the ￿rm is
￿ women-led￿ : Indicators for being promoted into a ￿rm with a female on the board, a female CEO, or at
least one woman among the group of VPs in the ￿rm. All ￿rm variables are lagged one year.
Sample means for the main variables in the basic model are shown in Appendix Table A2.
195 Estimation Results
5.1 The Gender Gap in Promotion Probabilities
The estimated marginal e⁄ects from the female indicator (F) are reported in Table 2 for di⁄erent spec-
i￿cations of the random e⁄ects (RE) logit models. The upper part of Table 2 refers to promotion from
POP to VP positions and the lower part refers to promotion from VP to CEO. In column 1, only the
female indicator and time indicators are included while in column 2 the ￿ basic￿individual human capital
and ￿rm variables are included. In general, all estimates of the parameter ￿ are signi￿cantly negative,
and controlling for individual human capital and ￿rm variables does not a⁄ect the size of the estimated
coe¢ cient. Thus, we cannot reject hypothesis (i) that ￿ is negative, i.e. there seems to be a gender gap
in the hiring probabilities into VP and CEO positions in Danish companies.
The estimated marginal e⁄ect of being a woman in the pooled logit estimations is about -0.006 for
promotion I and more negative, -0.016 for promotion II. When controlling for individual-speci￿c time-
invariant unobservables, the numerical size is reduced to about -0.003 and -0.009 for promotions I and
II, respectively. Controlling for ￿rm-speci￿c e⁄ects in promotion from POP to VP does not a⁄ect the
estimate of ￿ compared to controlling for individual-speci￿c e⁄ects. But for promotion from VP to CEO,
the ￿rm-speci￿c RE estimate of ￿ turns more negative, about -0.017, i.e. almost the same estimate
as in the pooled logit. Finally, we show the results from our preferred estimator (-0.003 and -0.021 for
promotion I and II, respectively) where we control for potential endogeneity of the F-variable by including
the ￿rm-speci￿c means value of F in the regression. Our estimation strategy is to use the ￿rm-speci￿c
RE estimator because it allows us to control for potential endogeneity of included variables, including the
gender dummy. Further, in the next sections we add a large number of family and household variables,
in order to control as much as possible for individual-speci￿c heterogeneity which may a⁄ect our estimate
of ￿.9
9One might argue that the individual-speci￿c RE estimator should be preferred. However, this estimator is clearly subject
to the ￿ ￿xed e⁄ect critique￿that unobservables for instance related to career preferences and family formation are not constant.
20(Table 2 about here)
In 2007, the raw gender gap for POP to VP promotions was 0.01, see Table1. By including observable
individual and ￿rm characteristics and time-invariant unobservable ￿rm characteristics, we are able to
￿ reduce￿ this gap to 0.03. For promotions into CEO positions, the observed gap was 0.017. In the
preferred estimation, controlling for observables and ￿rm-speci￿c time -invariant heterogeneity, the gender
gap increased from 0.017 to 0.021! Firstly, these results indicate that observable ￿rm and individual
characteristics in the basic model do not ￿ explain￿the observed gender gap. We cannot con￿rm hypothesis
(ii) that the estimated e⁄ect (￿) from statistical discrimination is numerically larger at lower levels of the
￿rm hierarchy compared to the gender gap for promotions into CEO positions. This must re￿ ect either
that the theoretical model for CEO promotions is more in line with a tournament process, or that ￿ belief
￿ ipping￿or a gender neutral promotion process as in the models by Fryer and Bjerk are not dominating.
Alternatively, the explanation could be that we do not add enough control variables to capture gender
di⁄erences in the parameters of these models.
5.2 Tenure in Di⁄erent Positions
As a ￿rst step to explain the unexplained ￿ gender gap￿in Table 2, we split the experience variable into
variables re￿ ecting the time spent in di⁄erent positions and allow both experience variables to have
gender-speci￿c e⁄ects on the promotion probabilities. In Table 3, the conditional sample means of the
variables age, experience, and tenure are shown for the year when a promotion occurs. Contrary to a
priori expectations, men are on average more than two years older than women when they are promoted
into VP positions (for men 41.7 years and 39.4 for women). The same picture holds for CEO promotions
(average age at promotion for men is 42.7 years and 41.0 for women). Women also tend to have less total
experience when promoted into VP and CEO positions though the di⁄erence is not signi￿cant for the
latter group. Finally in columns 3-5, the position-speci￿c experience as POP and VP is shown for those
who are promoted into VP and CEO positions. According to the theoretical model, one might expect
21that women had to have longer experience in lower positions before they were promoted because they
were not able to signal as intensively, or because their signals were more unclear. However, there are no
signi￿cant di⁄erences between men and women with respect to the average number of years they spend as
POP and VP until they are promoted into a higher level, conditional on being promoted.10 When we add
occupation-speci￿c experience and tenure into the preferred basic model estimated in Table 2 (and allow
for gender-speci￿c e⁄ects of these variables by interacting with gender), it does not reduce the estimated
gender gap in promotion into VP and CEO positions, see Appendix, Table A3.
(Table 3 about here)
5.3 Children and Husbands
As the next step to explain the unexplained ￿ gender gap￿￿, we include the number of children and the
position of the spouse as additional explanatory variables. The impact of children may run through a
number of channels. The more children in the family, the more income is needed to sustain a given level of
living standards. Usually, this income e⁄ect of children is stressed as an explanation of the positive impact
that children tend to have on fathers￿careers. For mothers, the ￿ child e⁄ect￿may be split into a number
of di⁄erent factors, assuming that mothers are the main caregivers for children during their childhood.
Applying the structure of the theoretical model, children are mainly assumed to a⁄ect the signalling
intensity of the mothers, ￿, and the number of successful tasks that mothers can perform during their
early career, s. There may also be an e⁄ect on the e⁄ort that women supply in the job, i.e. in practice
the states as being h- or l-workers may change over the life cycle: having children may change the status
from being an h-worker to being an l-worker. Further, the occupation of the spouse (whether spouse is
a CEO or has a lower position than a CEO position, excluded category is ￿ single￿ ) is assumed to proxy
distribution of housework within the family. We expect that being married to a spouse who is a CEO will
10Part of the reason that women are promoted at a relatively young age may be compositional e⁄ects due to the fact that
there are very few older women among the group of executives while the proportion of women is growing among the younger
cohorts.
22reduce e⁄ort and chances of becoming promoted.
Table 4 shows the sample values of these variables in 2007. In general, women in VP and CEO
positions have fewer children compared to their male peers. But the di⁄erences are not as signi￿cant as
found in many other countries. 13 % of the female CEOs have 3 kids or more (same ￿gure for men is 30
%). We also ￿nd that more female CEOs are singles, i.e. unmarried or divorced (24 % compared to 8 %
of the male CEOs). 15 % of the female CEOs are married to a CEO while the same ￿gure for male CEOs
is only 5 %.
(Tables 4 and 5 about here)
Do these gender di⁄erences in sample means of proxy variables for household responsibilities explain
the gender gap in promotion probabilities? In Table 5, the estimates of ￿ are shown after adding child
and spouse variables and gender interaction terms to the model. The answer is ￿ no￿ . The estimate of ￿ is
reduced, especially for VP-promotions, but still signi￿cant.
It is interesting to look at the sign and size of the coe¢ cients of the child and spouse variables, despite
one should be careful with causal interpretations of these variables (though as discussed in Section 2 we
include ￿rm means of these variables as instruments in the regression). The main e⁄ects of the spouse
and child indicators are all signi￿cantly positive while the interaction terms are negative and signi￿cant
in most cases. Thus, according to a priori expectations married men who are fathers tend to have higher
promotion rates into VP and CEO positions than single men and childless men. For women, this pattern
is not observed. For male executives, the size of the coe¢ cients seems to indicate that the more children
the better! For women who have not reached VP or CEO positions, the overall e⁄ect of children is that
the more children, the lower probability of promotion into a VP position. Surprisingly, the numerical size
of the negative child e⁄ect on female CEO promotion rates is not increasing with number of children.
The indicator for having 3 or more children even becomes insigni￿cant for female promotions into CEO
positions. Being married, even to a male CEO, does not reduce the promotion probability into CEO
positions for women. However, for women at lower ladders of their career, being married reduces the
23promotion chances into CEO positions.
5.4 Timing of Childbirths and Maternity Leave
In order to dig further down in the in￿ uence of children, we use the sample information on the timing of
childbirths and maternity and paternity leave periods spent out of the labor force in the past. Since the
late 1970s, Danish mothers have had the right to maternity leave with partly or full compensation, and
the duration of the maternity leave period has been extended gradually. In the ￿rst part of the observed
period, up to 2002, women were entitled to 14 weeks of maternity leave, fathers had two weeks and there
was a parental leave period of 10 weeks which either of the parents could take up, see Gupta et al. (2008).
Furthermore, there was a childcare leave scheme available for most parents. In 2002, the schemes were
changed and the childcare leave was ￿ converted￿into a formal parental leave of 26 weeks on top of the 10
weeks. Thus, since 2002 the maternity and parental leave period added up to 12 months per child. In total
about 6 % of the days spent in maternity and parental leave is picked up by fathers (population ￿gures
for Denmark), and this proportion has been quite stable since 1990. Virtually all families, including high
income families in top executive positions, take-up the full leave period, see Gupta et al. (2008) for a
more detailed description of the Danish leave schemes.
This picture is con￿rmed by the sample means in Table 6. In the full sample, i.e. including executives
with no children, the proportion who has ever taken maternity leave for more than 2 weeks is almost
the same across occupational positions, 18-27 % for males and 59-65 % for females. However, when
conditioning on being parents, some di⁄erences appear across the three groups of executives. The higher
up in the hierarchy, the fewer days spent in paternity leave for male executives. But for females this
pattern is not observed which may partly re￿ ect that female CEOs on average are older and for this
reason tend to have more kids, cet. par., see Table 4. On average, female (male) POPs have taken-up 396
(17) days of maternal/parental leave during their career. For VPs, these sample means are 347 and 14
24days, for females and males respectively, and for CEOs 355 and 11 days.11 According to Table 6, women
are on average about one year younger (27 years) than men (28 years) when they become parents for the
￿rst time with no notable di⁄erence between POPs, VPs and CEOs. On average, the youngest child is
aged between 15-17 years for the three groups. Fertility and career may of course interact in a complex
way which we do not aim to model in this paper, see Miller (2010).
(Tables 6 and 7 about here)
Table 7 shows the results from reestimating the model in Table 5 with additional variables re￿ ecting
alternative measures of take-up of leave periods due to childbirth. The leave period variables are added
to the model in Table 5, one at a time, i.e. ￿ve alternative models are estimated for each promotion rate.
The results reveal that there is still a signi￿cant estimate of ￿ in all models. Thus, in general we are not
able to con￿rm hypothesis iii.a, i.e. that the estimated gender gap in promotion probabilities is reduced
when including variables re￿ ecting timing and duration of leave periods.
In most cases, there are signi￿cant gender di⁄erences with respect to the coe¢ cient of leave variables
(models i ￿ iii). In general, the estimate of the parameter of take-up of leave schemes (main e⁄ect) is
signi￿cantly negative, as found in many other studies, see for instance Bertrand et al. (2010). But the
marginal female interaction e⁄ect tends to be positive and of about the same numerical size as the negative
main e⁄ect. Thus, men who take-up parental leave schemes tend to have lower promotion chances, but for
women there is no observed relation between take-up of parental leave schemes and promotion chances.
These results ￿t into the general statistical discrimination explanation and signalling theory: If all women,
including potential top executives, are expected to take-up most of the leave periods which they are eligible
to, the individual woman is not "punished" when actually taking-up her maternal/parental leave, while
the very few fathers who take-up part of the parental leave period (i.e. more than 2 weeks which is about
11Since data do not include information on maternity leave before 1984, we restrict the sample to women who had their
￿rst child after 1984. In the estimations we include all individuals, but include a dummy variable assuming the value of 1
for those individuals who were observed to give birth to their ￿rst child before 1984. Spouse information on leave periods is
only available after 1992. Thus, the variable ￿ proportion of leave days￿is only de￿ned for individuals having their ￿rst child
after 1992. Again, we include all observations, but add a dummy variable assuming the value of 1 for indviduals who had
children before 1992.
25the average take-up for Danish fathers) send a very negative signal to the employer, see Albrecht et al.
(1999). However, when interpreting the results in the framework put up in the theoretical model, the
results are less clear. From the predictions of Bjerk￿ s model, it would be expected that the e⁄ects were
numerically larger for promotions into VP positions where the negative signalling e⁄ect of ever having
taken-up parental or maternity leave might be more serious for promotions into VP positions than for
promotions from VP to CEO positions. And analogously for the other two leave variables. But the
estimated marginal e⁄ects are numerically largest (though often not signi￿cant) for promotions into CEO
positions.
The estimated marginal e⁄ect of age at ￿rst childbirth is signi￿cantly positive for promotion from POP
to VP, i.e. the probability of being promoted into a VP position increases with age when being parent for
the ￿rst time. However, for CEO positions, the picture seems to be di⁄erent. The main e⁄ect of ￿ age at
￿rst childbirth￿is insigni￿cant, but the estimated interaction e⁄ect is numerically large and signi￿cantly
negative.12 Thus, the estimations in Table 7 do not indicate that a good career advice for women is to
wait to have children until the career is ￿xed! Age at ￿rst birth seems to ￿ catch￿an important aspect
in the promotion process. One hypothesis may be that women who have their ￿rst child very early in
their career and succeed in reaching a position in the group of VPs, have more success in their signalling
as POPs or in doing successful tasks as VPs. There may be more reasons: Either they become more
e⁄ective during their career when they have children early, or the fact that they have children early and
still pursue a career is taken as a positive indication of being an h-worker.
12The variables ￿ age at ￿rst childbirth￿and ￿ years since last childbirth￿assume the value of 0 for childless individuals and
we include a dummy for childless indviduals in order to secure that these observations do not a⁄ect the estimate of the two
variables. ￿ Age at ￿rst childbirth￿is a time-constant variable, i.e. by de￿tion it does not vary over time for an individual.
Therefore, the dummy for childless individuals is not identical with the dummy for having no children in a given year, i.e.
we are able to identify the child indicators. We have experimented with many di⁄erent speci￿cations in order to test the
robustness of the numerically large coe¢ cient of the interaction term in model iv, but the result seems to be extremely
stable.One hypothesis might be that the variable ￿ age at ￿rst childbirth￿catches di⁄erences in female birth cohorts where
old cohorts tended to have their children earlier. However, this is not the case. Firstly, we control for age in the model.
Secondly, more detailed descriptions of the variable ￿ age at ￿rst childbirth￿do not reveal any systematic di⁄erences between
age groups or between the three groups of POPs, VPs and CEOs, see Table A4.
265.5 Female-Friendly or Female-Led Firms and Promotion
In the search for observed variables which may explain the estimated ￿ unexplained gender gap￿ ,
^
￿, we now
look to variables on the company-side which may explain the promotion gap. If the ￿rm has a female
CEO, this may a⁄ect the promotion chances of females into VP positions in the ￿rm, either because
these more or less female-led ￿rms may have di⁄erent information on female applicants or less prejudices
against women, or they may be better in decoding the signals from female applicants (i.e. ￿f is larger in
female-led ￿rms). In Models i-ii, we test these hypotheses. Another potential e⁄ect may be that a male
CEO may be in￿ uenced by his own family in his perception of women, either his wife or daughters may
a⁄ect the ￿ belief￿of a male CEO with respect to female skills and productivity.13 We test a hypothesis
that a male CEO who is either married to a female CEO/VP or has at least one adult daughter may
have changed his view of (modern) female potential executives more than males who do not have adult
daughters or are married to women who do not have their own career. If this is the case, it should be
easier for women to become promoted in ￿rms with a male CEO with an adult daughter or a CEO/VP
spouse, compared to other ￿rms. In Model iii, we test whether the promotion chances are related to
the proportion of women in the management board, i.e. other female VPs. If there are one or more
females in the management board, this may a⁄ect both the decoding chances of signals of potential top
executives (￿f) and the evaluation of tasks performed by women (￿) contrary to the assumption in Bjerk
(2008). We also test for the potential e⁄ect of having a large group of female potential top executives
which may a⁄ect the ￿ belief￿of the size of the ￿f;the proportion of females who are h-workers (Model
iv). We expect that a higher proportion of females in the POP group of the hiring ￿rm will increase
the chances for women to become promoted from POP to VP (but not from VP to CEO). For simplicity
we denote this type of e⁄ects as ￿ female-friendly￿e⁄ects. In Model v; we test whether there is a relation
between the gender of the chairman of board of directors and the gender of those who are promoted
13For CEO-promotion, the interpretation of the results Models i-ii is complex because there is only one CEO in the
company. If a CEO promotion, is observed this means that the previous CEO has left the position. Thus, the coe¢ cient of
gender of the previous CEO partly re￿ ects gender di⁄erences in CEO turnover. The estimations (not shown here) actually
indicate that female CEOs have a higher turnover than male CEOs.
27into CEO positions. In Models vi and vii; we include proxies for ￿ hierarchical distance￿between VP and
CEO positions. In Model vi; we add the variable ￿ Annual CEO compensation minus average annual VP
compensation￿ , and in Model vii; we add the variable ￿ Number of VPs in company￿ . Our expectation is
that including these two variables in Models vi ￿ vii may reduce the estimated gender gap in promotion
rates into CEO positions if women tend to have larger di¢ culties in reaching the top position when the
￿ hierarchical distance￿between CEO and VP positions is large, i.e. re￿ ecting that the competition for the
CEO position is larger (a more tough tournament). We include estimates for these models also for VP
promotions though we do not expect these variables to a⁄ect VP promotions. Table A5 shows the sample
means for the variables proxying the ￿ female-led and female-friendly￿hypotheses.
(Table 8 about here)
The size and signi￿cance of the estimates of ￿ in Table 8 indicate that including alternative variables
re￿ ecting ￿ female-led￿or ￿ female-friendly male leader￿variables has an e⁄ect on the estimates of ￿ in some
of the models on VP promotions, but not the models on CEO promotions. Thus, we are partly able to
con￿rm hypothesis (iii.b) that part of the gender gap in promotion chances for POPs into VP positions
is explained by variables proxying ￿ female-friendly￿preferences in the hiring companies. However, we are
still left with a signi￿cant unexplained gender gap in promotion probabilities into CEO positions. In
general, we ￿nd insigni￿cant estimates (not shown in Table 8) of the marginal e⁄ect from the interaction
term between having a female chairman of the board of directors or a female CEO of the ￿rm and being
a female applicant to a VP position.
5.6 What Explains Promotions into VP and CEO Positions? A Full Model
In Table 9, we show the results from a ￿ full model￿where we include most of the family and ￿rm variables
entered one at a time in the estimations above in order to test simultaneously the impact of the individual-
and ￿rm-related factors on promotion rates. A few variables are not included, either because their impact
in the previous estimations were minor or because they are by de￿nition correlated with other included
28variables.
(Table 9 about here)
According to Table 9, the unexplained gender gap is insigni￿cant for VP positions, but still about 1
% points for CEO positions when all explanatory variables are added to the model simultaneously. Most
of the family related-variables tend to be much more signi￿cant for explaining VP promotions compared
to CEO promotions. Most notable is the di⁄erence with respect to child coe¢ cients where the results
indicate that potential male top executives (POPs) bene￿t in their career prospects by having children,
but for female POPs there is not this positive e⁄ect (adding main e⁄ect and interaction e⁄ect the total
e⁄ect of children is slightly negative, though not signi￿cant in all cases). The signi￿cant e⁄ect of children
disappears for CEO promotions. Compared to the results in Table 5, the variable which according to
alternative estimations (not shown here) seems to a⁄ect the size of the child coe¢ cients in the CEO-
relation is ￿ age at ￿rst childbirth￿ . When controlling for age at ￿rst childbirth, the number of children in
itself does not have any signi￿cant e⁄ect on promotion chances into CEO positions, compared to having
no children. The size and sign of the coe¢ cient for the variable age at ￿rst childbirth indicate that if the
children are born early, conditional of having reached a VP position, children do not harm the career!
Our interpretation is that having children early in life, maybe already while being a student, may signal
that the woman is a highly productive individual (h-worker). For men, having children early does not
give any signal for the supervisors according to Table 9!
Partly the same picture is found with respect to the career of the spouse. For males, being married
improves the chances of promotion while for women this e⁄ect is much smaller, but still positive and
signi￿cant. For CEO promotions, we do not observe any di⁄erences between male and females with
respect to being married or not. Thus, women who reach a VP position do not seem to su⁄er with respect
to promotion chances from being married, even to a spouse who is also a CEO. As found in Table 7, we
￿nd a highly signi￿cant and negative e⁄ect of taking up paternity leave for the promotion chances of male
executives, but not for women.
29The variables related to ￿ women-led￿or female-friendly companies are shown in the lower part of Table
9. The higher the proportion of women on the executive board (VPs and CEOs), the higher the promotion
chances. The interpretation is that female VPs and CEOs have a higher turnover! We do not ￿nd that
a higher proportion of women in the management board increases the chances for female applicants. On
the contrary for CEO-positions. This result is di⁄erent from what is found in Bell (2005) for US ￿rms.
Surprisingly, we ￿nd a negative e⁄ect on female promotion chances for CEO positions from having a
female chairman of the board of directors. This may re￿ ect ￿ queen bee￿e⁄ects or that female chairmen
are at least as gender-stereotype as their male peers, a surprising result which is also found in another
recent Danish study by Neergaard et al. (2008). Alternatively, the result may re￿ ect a tokenism-e⁄ect,
i.e. if there is already one woman on board, no more women are hired.
The estimation of a full model in Table 9 shows that there still is an unexplained gender gap in
promotion probabilities for CEO positions when adding a large number of explanatory variables to the
model. For VP positions, the unexplained gender gap disappears in Table 9. Thus, as in other studies of
the Scandinavian labor market, see Albrecht et al. (2003) and Gupta et al. (2006), our results point to
an ￿ unexplained￿gap in the upper end of the labor market which we are not able to attach to individual-
or ￿rm-speci￿c factors. Instead, we interpret our results as re￿ ecting general mechanisms in the labor
market which give rise to statistical discrimination e⁄ects. Part of these ￿ mechanisms￿may be that there
still exist fairly stereotype views on males and females with respect to management requirements and
competencies.
These results may at ￿rst glance seem paradoxical for a Scandinavian country like Denmark which
was one of the ￿rst countries in the Western world where women entered the labor market. However,
as analyzed in other papers, see Gupta et al. (2008), it may be part of the ￿ boomerang e⁄ects￿of the
Scandinavian welfare state model which has facilitated women￿ s entrance into the labor market combined
with a high fertility rate, but at the same time it has made it more di¢ cult for women to take the last
steps to the top. Scandinavian women, including women at the upper end of the skill distribution, still
30have the main responsibilities at home and take up the majority of the very long maternity and parental
leave periods. An alternative explanation may be that women do not ￿nd it very attractive to become
CEOs because they have to give up too much to ￿ll a CEO position compared to the alternative as being
a VP or having a lower position which is more easily combined with having more kids and full take-up of
maternity leave schemes and other family-friendly schemes.
6 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper analyzes the gender gap in promotion into top corporate jobs based on employer-employee
data on all Danish companies. The ￿ raw￿VP- and CEO-promotion rates in the data set show a fairly
constant distance between males and females during the period 1997-2007. In 2007, 4.6 % of the males
and 3.6 % of the females in the group of potential top executives were promoted into a VP position while
for promotions from VP positions into CEO positions, the same ￿gures were 4.4 % and 2.7 %, respectively,
i.e. there was a gender gap of 1 % points for VP positions and 1.7 % points for CEO positions..
Firstly, we test whether these gender gaps are explained by gender di⁄erences in observed character-
istics or unobserved time-invariant characteristics of ￿rms or individuals. They are not! I.e. we cannot
explain the gender gap by women￿ s lack of formal observed or unobserved time-invariant competencies
or, probably more surprisingly, by some ￿rms being constantly more reluctant to hire or promote women
into top executive positions. Especially the last step from a VP position to a CEO position seems to
be a di¢ cult hurdle for women, also when controlling for a number of background characteristics of the
executives and companies. These results are not in line with models proposed by Fryer (2007) and Bjerk
(2008).
Secondly, we dig deeper in the explanations behind the gender gap in promotion probabilities by
focussing on a number of factors which may have di⁄erent e⁄ects on male and female careers at the
top level. We analyze the gender-speci￿c role of children, childbirth, and household responsibilities.
We have historical information on maternity, paternity and parental leave periods for the individuals
31(and their spouses) included in the sample. Our results indicate that time out of the labor market
and child-related decisions are important factors when explaining the gender gap in promotion into top
executive positions. Children seem to bene￿t the promotion rates of fathers, but have no e⁄ect on mothers￿
promotion chances, cet. par. However, if the fathers take up parental leave, they are strongly punished on
career prospects and promotions while the individual woman is not. For the small group of women who
succeed in becoming promoted from a VP position into a CEO position, age at ￿rst childbirth is strongly
negatively correlated with promotion chances, i.e. women who give birth at a relatively young age seem
to have higher promotion chances. For this group, the number of children has no signi￿cant e⁄ect on
women￿ s CEO-promotion probabilities. Our interpretation is that women who have their children at a
relatively young age (not teenagers, but at the age of around 21-24) and succeed in climbing the career
ladder into a position as VP, are able to signal that they are h-workers in a more convincing way than
women who have their children later in life. Though most of these observed family-related variables are
clearly important, we are still not able to explain the gender gap in promotion chances when including
these detailed variables re￿ ecting past decisions on leave periods and childbirths even when we allow the
coe¢ cients of these variables to be gender-speci￿c.
Therefore, we search for explanations on ￿rms￿side. We test a number of hypotheses about the
recruiting ￿rm. One hypothesis is that the barriers for women are minor in female-led companies, i.e.
companies with a female CEO, a chairman of the board of managers or a female VP. We conclude that
female-led ￿rms are either not di⁄erent from other ￿rms or in some cases hire fewer women into top
positions, compared to other companies, contrary to results found for US ￿rms by Bell (2005). The fact
that we do not ￿nd positive e⁄ects for Danish female-led ￿rms ￿ts with other empirical evidence for
Denmark saying that female managers may have more gender-stereotype ￿ beliefs￿than male managers on
female competences and the requirements for management positions.
This leaves the question: What else explains the low proportion of women in top executive positions
and the gender gap in the promotion into these positions? Our hypothesis is that statistical discrimination
32factors due to overall institutional mechanisms in the Danish society (and other Scandinavian countries)
are important. These ￿ welfare state e⁄ects￿may a⁄ect preferences and norms concerning female career
choices both on the demand and supply sides in a very general way, common to all individuals and
companies. Many women may not ￿nd it very attractive to become CEOs because they have to give up
too much to ￿ll a CEO position compared to the alternative as being a VP or having a lower position
which is more easily combined with having more kids and full take-up of maternity leave schemes and
other family-friendly schemes, i.e. to rewrite the words by the former Danish CEO, Stine Bosse: ￿ Be
in positions where they can still have a life￿ . If this view or expectation is widespread, also among the
recruiting board of directors who make the promotion decisions for CEO positions, this may explain at
least part of the unexplained gender gap in CEO promotions in Denmark.
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